old loans to companies with good financial profiles, the incentive to lend money to cashstrapped borrowers has decreased because the risk of lending has increased. 19 Moreover, because some companies "gorged themselves" on cheap credit in better economic conditions, they now have limited collateral to pledge as security for any DIP financing that may appear. 20 As one credit analyst put it, "Why would you lend to an insolvent company when you can invest in other [debt] products with [similar] risk and higher returns?"
21
While the government wants to stabilize financial markets and stimulate bank lending through various programs like the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 22 and
Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIF), 23 companies on the verge of bankruptcy still face an uncertain future. 24 DIP lending has generally become scarce and quite expensive once found. 25 The lack of DIP lending caused some companies to delay Chapter 11 filing.
26
Other companies that file for protection could be forced to liquidate due to the lack of cash to continue operations during their bankruptcies.
27 19 Id. 20 Merced, supra note 12. 21 Levisohn, supra note 14. 22 See Bernanke, Club of New York, supra note 17. There are, however, still several players committed to the DIP financing market. 28 In fact, General Electric Capital (GE), historically one of the largest providers of DIP lending, "plans to hand out approximately $2 billion in debtor-in-possession loans this year, up from the $1.9 billion it awarded companies restructuring under Chapter 11 protection last year." 29 GE's willingness to increase funding for DIP lending, however, likely cannot meet the increased demand for loans because "the number of bankruptcies
[should] climb by a much higher rate than five percent, the increase to the amount the firm has set aside for [DIP lending]." 30 GE will also charge higher rates for the DIP loans it does make, which will inevitably price some borrowers out of the market. 31 Many lenders are likely to play follow-the-leader when it comes to pricing loans.
II. REGIONAL AND COMMUNITY BANKS AS A NEW SOURCE OF DIP LENDING
Quite logically, the largest providers of pre-recession DIP financing were the large financial institutions. The acquisition of a massive market share by these lenders comes from their corporate expansions. 33 As a historical comparison, "In 1985, there were 14,000 community banks with inflation-adjusted assets of less than one billion
Hop Retail Chain-Against All Odds Cites Crunch, N.J. RECORD, Jan. 7, 2009, at B01. The ironically named retailer plans to use the DIP loan to pay off creditors, then close stores on the West Coast and "either reorganize or sell its East-Coast locations." Id.
dollars. Today, their number is smaller by half. Many communities, especially those in urban America, have lost most or all of their local banks." 34 The large fund reserves and national prominence put big institutions at the top of the lending market. 35 The changing economy and its corresponding damage to many large lenders, however, will limit these lenders' abilities to be the main source of funding for the immediate future.
36

A. Reasons Why Regional and Community Banks Would Provide DIP Financing
The current crisis has generated a tidal wave of distrust in the banking industry as a whole. 37 First, bank executives do not trust their counterparts at other institutions because they simply cannot tell what debt is good, 38 even in the context of a merger.
39
This lack of trust could prevent large lenders not only from working with one another, but taking on some loans made by other lenders. More damaging, however, is the lack of 34 Id. 35 Id. Indeed,
[f]or decades now, most experts have argued that in finance, bigger is better. With their economies of scale, larger institutions are more efficient, goes the reasoning. They can match up lenders and borrowers all about the globe, tapping into places where money is piling up (like China or the United Arab Emirates) and directing those funds to borrowers in places where money is scarce (like Stockton, California, or East Cleveland, Ohio). the word on the street from the man on the street (latest Gallup polls) is that consumers are currently enrolled in a 12-step program and it may be premature to expect them to fall off the wagon anytime soon. Consumers are still too painfully aware of hitting rockbottom, and not enough progress has been made or enough time has passed to induce a false sense of self-control over their addiction to credit. Yesterday's Personal Income and Outlays economic report shows that consumers are holding on to their precious dollars. December 2008 spending declined for its sixth consecutive month, falling -1% after the previous month's -0.8% reading. Faced with shrinking income and the prospects of rising unemployment trends, borrowing money without certainty of the means to repay it may curb the cravings for more debt.
Id.
41 "[W]orries about which bank will be the next to fall may prompt customers to spread their money across multiple banks, benefiting some tiny ones, said Don Musso, president of financial consulting firm FinPro. 'The days of one-stop financial shopping are probably over.'" Lazarowitz, supra note 36. The customer loss from lack of faith is in addition to other issues that arise from big bank mergers, such as the change of financial products at the new institution and inevitable glitches from combining two entities. Id.
to make loans. 44 The size of these banks means that some DIP loans are too large for them to make, but perhaps joint ventures between groups of banks can help bridge some of this gap. This possibility is realistic because smaller banks had less exposure to market loss, and their leaders may trust one another's balance sheets. If executives trust one another, they should be more likely to work together on lending commitments.
Additionally, smaller banks generally have better relations with the members of their communities, which could mitigate the general lack of trust of financial institutions.
45
Given that smaller banks seem perfectly positioned to take advantage of the weaknesses of bigger lenders, they are a good option for prospective debtors in search of funding.
B. Reasons Why Regional and Community Banks Would Not Provide DIP Financing
To be sure, smaller banks will not prove to be a panacea for every debtor. There are several problems preventing regional and community banks from completely filling the need for DIP financing. First, smaller lenders have taken federal funds-notably from TARP-and may take a public image beating as a result. 46 This public image problem According to FDIC data, the failure rate among big banks (those with assets of $1 billion or more) is seven-times greater than among small banks. Moreover, banks with less than $1 billion in assets-what are typically called community banks-are outperforming larger banks on most key measures, such as return on assets, charge-offs for bad loans, and net profit margin. Another likely scenario is that debtors will simply need more cash than these banks can provide, forcing them to turn to larger lenders. 48 Large bankruptcies, such as Lyondell, simply require too much money than any smaller lender can realistically make available. Combined with confidence concerns, this factor could hinder the power of many small lenders to participate in the large-scale DIP loans that current debtors need.
Finally, the higher default rates on the collateral that forms the basis for the security of regional and community bank loans, like homes and cars, could present a sizeable problem. 49 These defaults mean that smaller banks will have less liquidity and thus 47 "In fact, the emerging pattern with federal TARP-Troubled Asset Relief Program-money is that it's the healthiest banks who are getting the funds, while more troubled institutions may be deemed ineligible." Id.
48
In the years to come, giants like Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America may emerge even bigger and stronger, leaving small banks facing more formidable foes than before, analysts said. Their bulk and broad reach will let them offer more services, faster and for less, squeezing out some competition. Additionally, debtors must pay DIP loans in full by the effective date of the plan.
54
Moody's reports that, as a result of these protections, only one of the 297 DIP facilities made to large, publicly traded companies since 1988 was not fully repaid. 55 The legal protections, combined with twenty years of historical data, suggest DIP loans can be low risk investments for hedge funds and private-equity firms. Hedge funds and privateequity investors are wary of the current economic environment and its risks. As a result, these groups may embrace the legal protections and low-risk investment opportunities of DIP loans.
Pricing and Term
While many traditional DIP lenders have become more hesitant to provide DIP financing, the need for DIP financing has increased as a result of the recession.
56
Consequently, DIP loans have drastically increased in price. 57 As recently as 2007, interest rates for DIP loans averaged LIBOR plus 250 basis points. 58 In the current environment, lenders charge as much as LIBOR plus 1000 basis points and up front fees of 3.5% of the total commitment amount, with an additional three-percent fee due when the debtor exits bankruptcy. 59 The maturity rates for DIP loans are decreasing as the costs increase. Previously, the average DIP loan matured between twelve and eighteen months 54 
Investment Opportunity
Private equity and hedge funds may recognize DIP financing as an investment opportunity during the current economic downturn. While many traditional DIP lenders are struggling to manage their liquidity, fund managers possess the cash to participate in DIP lending. 62 Hedge funds manage an estimated one trillion dollars in assets, 63 while private equity funds raised $265 billion in 2008.
64
In South Florida alone, fund managers have created several "opportunity funds"
to capitalize on distressed real-estate investments. 65 These funds could both purchase a portion or all of a distressed company's debts and later become a DIP creditor. 66 As DIP creditors, these funds would have more control of the company's reorganization. Debtors also want to retain as much cash for operations after exiting bankruptcy, rather than repay all of their creditors in full. Therefore, debtors can offer their post-petition and prepetition lenders equity in the newly restructured companies in exchange for reduced debt 60 Holman, supra note 52. 61 Id. obligations. 67 Private equity and hedge funds can use these debtors' behavior to implement a "loan to own" strategy to gain control of a target company as a DIP lender.
68
Whether lending purely for the short-term return on a low-risk loan or as a strategy to gain equity in a target company, DIP financing provides private equity and hedge funds additional investment opportunities in the current economic environment. The DIP structures in Lyondell and Aleris, along with the Aladdin fund, could be just the beginning of an increased role by hedge and equity funds in DIP financing.
Investment Protection and Control
Whether the participation of hedge and equity funds as direct DIP lenders will continue is still uncertain. Government incentives or guarantees could encourage private equity and hedge funds to increase their participation.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND DIP LENDING
The so-called "$64,000 question" when determining who is going to act as a DIP Chrysler into federal bankruptcy protection, agreeing to lend the company another eight billion dollars. 98 Additionally Canada has agreed to provide $2.42 billion in DIP financing. 99 The amount of Government DIP financing for GM will dwarf these numbers.
Arguments Supporting the Government as a Direct DIP Lender
The most obvious argument for direct U.S. Government lending to larger distressed businesses is the current scarcity of DIP financing. DIP loans through private institutions are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. 100 Combine that difficulty with the high cost associated with a bankruptcy like GM and obtaining DIP financing becomes a herculean task. 101 Therefore, without direct government lending, many large corporate bankruptcies could fail, deepening the current economic crisis. 102 By injecting money into the DIP lending market, the government would be helping the economy by saving jobs that would otherwise be liquidated with the company.
Government DIP lending could also benefit the taxpayer. In the past, DIP financing has been quite profitable. 103 Indeed, both the fees and the interest derived from a multi-billion dollar DIP loan would be substantial. 104 101 See Merced, supra note 97 (noting that while a GM bankruptcy could cost anywhere from $50 billion to $100 billion, the largest DIP loan on record is $8 billion). 102 It is possible that the government would use a financial firm as a conduit between it and the distressed corporation. Indeed, Edward I. Altman, a bankruptcy expert and a professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University, advocates such an approach if the government were to loan large amounts of money to GM. Id.
as the DIP lender of last resort, could get interest rates even higher than the 9.5% above benchmark interbank rates.
105
DIP loans can be considered relatively safe. As discussed earlier, priming liens and priorities would protect the taxpayer losses on the loan. 106 Effectively, the DIP lender would be at the head of the line, thus minimizing the risk of the loans and earning significant returns for the taxpayers.
Arguments Against Direct Government DIP Lending.
The strongest argument against government backed DIP lending is the cost. The government has already allowed the United States Department of the Treasury to purchase or insure up to $700 billion of "troubled" assets. 107 The Obama administration recently unveiled a new plan that could put even more taxpayer money at risk. Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner unveiled a plan that could buy up to two trillion dollars in real-estate assets. 108 The plan was more generous toward private investors than many expected, but puts trillions of taxpayer dollars at great risk as a result.
109
It is possible, however, that, with this much money being handed out, the taxpayers could overlook a few hundred billion dollars toward select bankruptcy DIP Additionally, it may result in only those companies that lobby for funds ultimately receiving the funds. While this empirical argument may be true, it is hasty to say it trumps other arguments without some sort of quantitative proof that only companies that participate in the lobbying process will receive DIP loans. This argument against direct government DIP lending is also less persuasive because of the amount of money actually used on lobbying. When a company like GM needs billions of dollars in loans, concern over spending a few million dollars seems overstated.
More problematic is the government's attempt to dictate GM's potential bankruptcy. GM bondholders are being pushed hard to accept a ten-percent equity stake in full satisfaction of approximately twenty-seven billion dollars in loans. 113 The UAW, however, is being offered a thirty-five percent equity stake in exchange for ten billion dollars of unsecured debt. Similar problems are already occurring with the Chrysler bankruptcy. 114 A hedge fund that invested in Chrysler may receive less than thirty percent of its investment, while a UAW health-care fund may receive a fifty-five percent equity stake in Chrysler. 115 While this favoritism is worrisome, the need for Government intervention is a necessity, for, without it, both GM and Chrysler would likely be forced into liquidation. The liquidation of Chrysler and GM and the economic waves it would create may hurt creditors even more than any sort of government favoritism.
B. Another Approach: Using the Small Business Administration as a Model
In 1952, a new agency was founded, the Small Business Administration (SBA). 116 The purpose of the SBA is to "aid, counsel, assist and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns." 117 The SBA accomplishes this by directly loaning funds to small businesses and guaranteeing private loans. 118 For example, the SBA 7(a)
guaranteed loan program provides a guarantee for seventy-five percent to eighty-five percent of the bank's loans.
119
The SBA loan program could be a template for a similar program guaranteeing DIP loans. 120 If a bank identifies a debtor who needs DIP financing, the bank could then apply to this new DIP lending agency. Like in the SBA 7(a) program, the lender would document the loans. However, the agency must approve the loans before disbursing funds. 121 Additionally, the private lender would pay this new DIP lending agency a monthly servicing fee. The servicing fee for the SBA is 0.5%, 122 but the DIP lending agency's fee could be higher or lower.
Arguments for a DIP Lending Agency
The strongest argument for guaranteeing DIP loans is that the guarantee drastically reduces the risk for banks, thus unfreezing the current DIP lending market. Therefore, a DIP lending agency could benefit both banks and distressed companies seeking financing.
Arguments Against a DIP Lending Agency
Money is the biggest impediment to a governmental DIP lending agency. In the current economic crisis, the sheer amount of bankruptcies could overwhelm such a new program. If the budget for the DIP lending agency were similar to that of the SBA, it would be around $669 million. 126 This budget would make it impossible for a DIP lending agency to guarantee a loan for a company like GM. Absent a very large budget, the DIP lending agency would be forced to focus on smaller bankruptcies, although this limitation may not be a bad thing.
Problematically, a DIP lending agency puts taxpayer money at risk without the same potential for reward as a direct government DIP loan. If a number of DIP loans fail, the government bears the brunt of the risk. Additionally, the potential investment benefit for taxpayers could be reduced because the government may only be able to require a percentage fee from the interest rate charged to the DIP, while a direct governmentlending fee could charge both a high interest rate and fees. Finally, a DIP lending agency's guarantee program could scare away lenders if they charged too high of a fee.
Therefore, a DIP lending agency could be a difficult sell to the taxpayers.
C. Support For a DIP Lending Agency and Direct Government Lending
Direct government lending and a DIP lending agency are both steps that could help more companies effectively come out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. While there are arguments against implementing these provisions, the need for reliable DIP lending outweighs the negative considerations. Both recommendations, direct government lending and a DIP lending agency, would address the freeze in DIP financing. Direct government lending would address larger bankruptcies, while a DIP lending agency that guarantees private loans could handle smaller DIP loans.
Accordingly, a company that can secure DIP financing and smoothly exit out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy will be able to save more jobs.
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As of April 2009, it is almost certain that the government will "leverage the promise of taxpayer financing" as a way to restructure GM. is moving toward a bankruptcy landscape in which the government is the DIP lender of last resort.
V. FUTURE PERILS OF DIP FINANCING
A. Inflation and DIP Financing
Inflation's Effect on the Players in Chapter 11
While alternative sources of DIP lending could stimulate the DIP lending market for future Chapter 11 bankruptcies, all of the theories discussed above assume that DIP lending is a relatively safe investment. In these uncertain economic times, however, this assumption may be incorrect. Since the collapse of the credit and securitization markets, the accuracy of predicted default rates on loans of all kinds has been thrown into doubt.
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Many commentators see the failure of the bond rating agencies to accurately assess the risk of various instruments as a "but for" cause of the current economic crisis, and trust in such ratings will return at a gradual rate. 131 Individuals' trust in banks, and perhaps more importantly trust between financial institutions, has dwindled to such low levels that the credit markets have "frozen" in a way never before seen. 132 The velocity of money, in the parlance of economics, has decreased with great speed. 133 President Obama, the U.S.
Congress, Secretary of the Treasury, and Federal Reserve Bank's approach to fixing the banking and financial system has included tremendously increasing the money supply in a very short time by a variety of means, some of which have never been used. 134 This "systemic-fix-by-injecting-liquidity" method is likely to lead to rapid inflation once the velocity of money increases, and the credit markets "unfreeze." 135 The denizens of our current recession, rapid erosion of trust in financial institutions, and the massive increases Gongloff goes on to say that until a banking fix, the velocity of money is unlikely to increase, keeping inflation under control. Ironically, the banking sector's enormous market gains since this article was published may now give greater cause for alarm as to inflation. Gongloff, supra.
in the money supply aimed at preventing a financial systems failure-which is likely to cause inflation-pose dramatic changes to the landscape of DIP finance. The two-tonelephant in the room is rapid inflation. Inflation will likely follow this money-supply increase when the velocity of money slows down to more normal levels. 136 Rapid inflation threatens to shake up the Chapter 11 process, which will ultimately affect the terms and availability of DIP lending.
137
Changes to DIP lending partially come from a proportional increase in value of the collateral to the loans secured by that collateral. 138 In an inflationary environment, the goods against which inflation are measured appreciate in lock step with inflation, as the market price for those goods goes up. 139 The prices of goods that are not used to measure inflation and the prices of services and intangibles also go up as the dollar becomes weaker. 140 Widget manufacturers need to pay higher prices in this inflationary environment to make new widgets. Also, the benefit of higher profits is offset because inflation makes profits consist of less-valuable dollars. But secured debt, which consists of a fixed dollar amount before an inflationary cycle begins, becomes a relatively smaller percentage of the debtor's borrowing base because other debts that are not fixed in amount increase. 141 Due solely to inflation, which increases the dollar value of the debtors collateral, some under-secured claims will become fully secured. 142 As a result, inflation tends to benefit junior lien holders and under-secured creditors.
Another important effect of rapid inflation is that pre-inflation interest rates become extremely favorable to the debtor. The debtor can use the cheap pre-inflation loan funds to make greater profits over the term of the loan because inflation drives up the interest rates for new loans. This business edge may be considerable. Lenders that lend money in strong dollars and get repaid in weak dollars stand to lose money. A lender in this position would prefer to be paid back in full as quickly as possible. Depending on the level of inflation, repayment-even in full-at the agreed-to interest rate over a lengthy timeframe could be a calamitous loss if higher-yield investments exist. Debtors may find it advantageous to stay in business during an inflationary period for more reasons than simply retaining favorable interest rates on unsecured loans. The more plentiful, weaker dollars a business can earn to pay back strong dollars borrowed means that debtors will emerge from bankruptcy more quickly. Further, if debt is paid down in weak dollars, the debtor effectively "buys" its encumbered property from lenders at favorable pre-inflation "prices" (the loan amount) and with money borrowed at low pre-inflation interest rates. The debtor can exploit its pre-inflation position by acquiring the means-be it the factory, inventory, below-market leases, or favorable contracts-to earn large profits.
Simply put, the debtor can realize large gains by staying in business in an inflationary environment. Secured lenders, who can be paid out in full on the effective date of a plan, 146 can find a way out of bad interest rates through bankruptcy, and more debt becomes secured by the increased value of the debtor's collateral in nominal dollars due to inflation. Unsecured creditors lose big because interest rates on the money they lent the debtor were locked in before inflation, but may fare better by receiving more return-on-the-dollar than would be available in a liquidation. 147 To avoid liquidation, the debtor needs funding to work through the restructuring. This makes the DIP lender a crucial party. The large amount the debtor stands to gain also makes DIP financing worth paying a high interest rate.
Why the New DIP Lenders Can Expect Big Returns on Their Money
Debtors stand to gain significantly from reorganizing successfully in Chapter 11 during times of inflation. In order to do so, however, they will need financing. Their secured lenders are not likely to provide more funds since they benefit enormously from liquidation; providing funds for reorganization will make early liquidation less likely. At the very least, a secured creditor could force a cram down, and this kind of delay goes against the notion of giving new money to the debtor.
The debtor might believe that staying in business is worth paying high interest rates on a new DIP loan if the profit margin of the business increases. In addition, debtors are incentivized to stay in business by keeping favorable interest rates on their unsecured 146 Id. weaker dollars, and they will likely be collected faster and with greater frequency, making them a more attractive form of collateral.
The debtor has a tough task when negotiating with potential DIP lenders. The main negotiations will center on how high the interest rates on the DIP loan will be.
Inflation drives up interest rates for all loans. 153 The debtor's need for funds will also weaken its bargaining position. New DIP lenders will likely want very high rates for their 155 However, because courts will only grant priming liens if no other financing option is available, the court would likely ask if the debtor sought financing at prevailing market interest rates. 156 Assuming the debtor can find another lender by soliciting loans with market interest rates, secured lenders can expect to remain first in line.
Since goods are a safe store of value in an inflationary period, as described above, DIP lenders might also insist on agreements that give them ownership of collateral free and clear of liens if the debtor defaults, even if that means giving secured creditors cash payment for the full amount of their liens. DIP lenders who "loan to own" might see opportunity in reselling collateral or in acquiring equity in business that own certain collateral types. This collateral, and the business that continues to use it, will "appreciate" quickly in inflationary environments when the market will bear a price high enough to outpace inflation and represent a profit in real dollars when collateral or equity shares are sold in the future.
The topic of carve outs in the first-day pleadings will probably become a contentious battle between the new DIP lender and the secured creditors because the parties have sharply opposing interests. 157 Negotiations may break down, and the breakdown can weaken the debtor's bargaining chip of limiting the uncertainty of administrative expenses by waiving surcharges. 158 Section 506(c) provides that after reasonable expenses of administration that benefit the secured creditor are paid to the debtor, the lien holder must receive the remainder of the sale price of collateral. As discussed above, inflation will increase this residual amount of sale value considerably.
B. Legal and Economic Effects on DIP Default Risk
Another current challenge in DIP lending is the potential increase in the default risk of DIP loans. Although DIP loans have historically enjoyed low default rates, the 2005 BAPCPA amendments to the Bankruptcy Code could increase risk of default on DIP loans in the current environment. 159 These amendments limit the debtors' exclusive right to file a reorganization plan to eighteen months. 160 Under the prior law, judges could extend the debtors' exclusive rights for as long as they felt was reasonable. 161 Now, after eighteen months, other parties in interest can submit competing reorganization plans.
162
During the exclusivity period, other parties can also lobby to reject the debtor's plan and begin to negotiate an alternative plan amongst each other knowing that opportunity to submit that plan is only eighteen months away at most. 163 This situation could cause an increase in DIP loan defaults, as debtors may not exit the bankruptcy prior to the maturity of the loan.
164
Another possible cause for an increase in DIP loan default risk is that credit markets have slowed due to the economy and financial market instability. Accordingly, debtors may have difficulty obtaining exit financing loans made to fund the restructuring and repay the DIP loan and pre-petition creditors. 165 Without an exit loan, debtor companies will be unable to successfully reorganize, repay creditors, and exit bankruptcy.
DIP loans will, therefore, exceed their maturity dates and go into default. This default leaves the lenders with the decision to (1) extend exit financing to the debtor, (2) extend the maturity for the DIP loan with the hope that the debtor can find either exit financing or a buyer for the company, or (3) call in the loan and force the company to liquidate its assets to repay the loan balance. None of these options are ideal for DIP lenders. 164 FAHY, supra note 55, at 6-7. 165 McCracken & Glader, supra note 27.
term commitment, which results in higher risks. 166 Likewise, extending the maturity of the DIP loan increases the lender's risk because an exit loan or buyer may not materialize.
Finally, in a default or asset sale, the lender's protection consists of the value of the collateral securing the loan. In this economy, ensuring adequate collateral coverage may be difficult. 167 The borrowers' receivables may quickly drop in value as their customers' businesses struggle, or the market to purchase the borrowers' inventory may diminish. 168 Should DIP lenders overestimate the value of their collateral, they face the real risk of not being fully repaid.
169
Should DIP loans begin to default at never before seen levels, the new and historical lenders may rapidly withdraw from the market. This exodus could cause the market for DIP lending to "freeze" again. One of the main incentives for DIP lending in this uncertain market is the historically low risk of DIP loan defaults. The legal effects of BAPCPA, the lack of exit financing, or the uncertainty of asset valuation could cause a rapid increase in DIP lender withdrawal, resulting in a more permanent freeze to the DIP lending market. .The liquidation value of Delphi's receivables and inventory presumably are much less because American automobile companies, either bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy, may not be able to repay their receivables and the demand for Delphi's products decreased as result of the economic downturn. 169 The Winstar Communications DIP loan illustrates this point. Winstar was the previously referenced loan DIP loan not to be repaid in the last twenty years of Moody's tracking of DIP loans to large publically traded companies. Winstar was a telecommunications company; while the company was in bankruptcy, the telecom industry crashed. After the sale of the companies' assets, the DIP recovery was estimated to be only twenty percent to thirty percent. FAHY, supra note 55, at 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
While these new or lesser-used resources for DIP lending may meet current and future demand, other legal and economic factors could quickly derail this process. That being said, the future of DIP lending simply remains uncertain. The historic safety of DIP default rates, combined with the increase in loan prices, should attract investors to the market.
Without DIP loan to maintain business operations during bankruptcy, companies may be forced to liquidate rather than reorganize under Chapter 11. In order to stop the "Great Recession" from worsening, alternative sources of DIP lenders must emerge to help fill the new void. Each of the participants discussed above-smaller banks, equity and hedge funds, and the government-could take a more active and prominent role in the future of DIP lending. Each participant faces both unique and universal challenges, but each could also profit from the demand for DIP loans in the current conditions. If this theory holds true, the economy as a whole would benefit significantly. More companies could survive the "Great Recession" and continue to provide much-needed products, revenue, and jobs to this economy.
